The question of the possibility of freedom in the critique of pure reason: an interpretation of B 560 and B 586

Abstract

It is undeniable that the passages B 560 and B 586 from The Critique of Pure Reason are apparently paradoxical. That is because, although Kant has affirmed there being a possibility of freedom on the solution of the third antinomy (B560), in apparent contradiction to this result, he claims, on a passage from the ninth section of the second chapter in the second book of Transcendental Dialect, not even having had the problem of demonstrating the possibility of that concept. This problem, correlated to the difficulty of making those passages compatible is the motive for the engendering of this paper. Therefore, this work aims to explain why the passages mentioned above are not contradictory. They are not, so far the meaning of the term ‘possibility’ employed on the passages is ambiguous, that is, it conveys more than one meaning. Distinguishing the meaning of the concepts of logic and real possibility present in these two passages, one can not only solve this problem, but enable a systemic harmony between the first and its second major criticism that would present the analysis of the same rationality, but in its practical that the possibility of freedom was dependent.