Perception as a type of alteration according to Aristotle

Authors

  • Juliana Aggio

Keywords:

Knowledge. Perception. Sensible object. Soul and body.

Abstract

This paper intends to clarify how perception knows the being according to Aristotle by treating a very controversial point: how perception discriminates its own objects and if this discrimination is strictly a physiological process or it is also an activity of the soul, and if it is also an activity of the soul, in which way the body’s physical alteration conjoined with a certain activity of the soul constitute perception.

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Author Biography

Juliana Aggio

Doutoranda em Filosofia USP/Fapesp.

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Published

2009-07-01

How to Cite

Aggio, J. (2009). Perception as a type of alteration according to Aristotle. Argumentos - Revista De Filosofia, 1(2). Retrieved from http://200.129.40.241/argumentos/article/view/18925

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 2

Section

Artigos

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